How to read the EU–Mercosur agreement, Argentina’s emerging leadership, and the opportunities Uruguay should not ignore
We are living through a peculiar moment in the international system.
Never before has so much information been available, and at the same time, it has never been so difficult to identify which events are truly strategic and which are merely amplified media noise. Actions with enormous real impact are overshadowed by flashy, controversial, or even absurd narratives that dominate headlines, social media, and public debate, while deeper processes move forward almost unnoticed.
The public discussion around Greenland, installed in the global agenda at the same time as critical episodes in Venezuela and other sensitive scenarios, is an almost textbook example. Not because Greenland lacks strategic value, which it certainly has, but because that value can be managed quietly, cooperatively, and effectively without turning it into a spectacle. When spectacle is chosen instead, it is worth asking why.
This logic is not new, but today it has become systematic.
Noise serves a function. It captures attention, generates emotional polarization, simplifies discussion, and displaces from the spotlight those issues that require analysis, patience, and political responsibility. Global journalism, far from resisting this dynamic, often amplifies it. Not out of conspiracy, but out of incentives. Eye-catching stories sell better than structural ones.
If one wants to understand the world from a strategic perspective, the first step is to separate layers.
There is a structural layer, slow and measurable, moving over decades. There is a tactical layer, where decisions with immediate impact are made within that structure. And there is a narrative layer, where stories are built to justify, conceal, or sell the previous two.
Confusing these layers is the most common mistake.
Let us take the European Union–Mercosur agreement. Public debate tends to oscillate between uncritical celebration and fatalistic condemnation. Neither position helps to understand what is really at stake.
It is true that Mercosur’s current productive structure is asymmetric relative to Europe. The region mainly exports primary goods and agro-industrial products, and imports manufactured goods with higher value added. It is also true that Brazil, the central actor in the bloc, has experienced a relative process of deindustrialization over recent decades. Denying this would be denying the evidence.
But from these facts it does not automatically follow that the agreement “certifies” an irreversible sentence of underdevelopment. That is an ideological conclusion, not a strategic necessity.
A trade agreement does not by itself determine the fate of a region. What defines trajectories is how it is used, which policies accompany it, which incentives are created, which capabilities are developed, and above all, whether there is a strategy of one’s own.
Europe is not signing this agreement out of altruism or multilateral romanticism. It is doing so because it needs to diversify suppliers, secure critical inputs, reduce strategic dependencies, and project regulatory influence. From its point of view, this is a rational decision.
The relevant question is not whether this is good or bad in the abstract, but which probabilities it opens for Mercosur countries depending on the decisions they make.
From a prospective point of view, at least three plausible trajectories can be imagined.
A first one, with high probability if nothing changes, is the consolidation of the current pattern. Primary exports, low technological content, logistical dependence, and weak regional integration. In this scenario, the agreement merely formalizes what already exists. It neither significantly worsens nor improves the situation, but it crystallizes inertia.
A second trajectory, with medium but growing probability, is that of smart specialization. Using market access, standards, and predictability to attract investment, scale agro-industry, knowledge-based services, advanced logistics, and resource-linked manufacturing. This requires active policies, public-private coordination, and regional vision. It does not happen automatically, but it is far from unrealistic.
The third trajectory, with low probability but high impact, is strategic rupture. A Mercosur that redefines its internal integration, builds regional value chains, negotiates from greater productive density, and uses external agreements as instruments rather than destinations. It is difficult, but not impossible. It requires political leadership, something historically scarce in the region.
This is where Argentina comes in.
The current Argentine process, regardless of sympathies or rejections, introduces a disruptive factor in South America. For the first time in decades, a central country in the region is attempting, with initial success, to dismantle a model of hyper-regulation, chronic deficit, and corporate capture of the state. This is not a minor experiment.
Argentina is showing that it is possible to stabilize macroeconomics, reduce inflation, realign incentives, and speak in terms of productivity, investment, and clear rules. The outcome is still open, but the direction is clear.
If Argentina consolidates this path, it will become the main vector of regional change. Not through political hegemony, but through empirical demonstration. Nothing influences more than a neighbor that begins to perform better by doing something different.
For Uruguay, this is crucial.
Uruguay does not have the scale to lead South America, but it does have the capacity to read signals, anticipate, and choose wisely. Its greatest risk is not signing agreements, but remaining immobile while the environment changes.
A Mercosur with a reformist Argentina, a pragmatic Brazil, and a Europe seeking reliable partners opens an interesting strategic space for Uruguay. But only if it abandons the comfort of commentary and moves toward project definition.
The key, then, is not to fall into media noise, nor to embrace fatalistic narratives. It is to think probabilistically. To ask which scenarios are more plausible, which decisions increase or reduce probabilities, and where it makes sense to position oneself.
The world does not move by slogans, but by incentives, capabilities, and power correlations. Those who confuse narrative with structure are condemned to always react too late.
Separating distraction from real intention is not cynicism. It is intellectual responsibility. And in times of noise, thinking calmly becomes, paradoxically, the most disruptive act of all.
