Secularism, Sovereignty and the Constitution: A Debate That Goes Beyond a Council

The proposal to create a Council on Secularism revives the constitutional debate over state neutrality and the limits of parliamentary power in relation to popular sovereignty.

In a previous article, we referred to Senator Bordaberry’s bill, which sought to create a Council on Secularism to safeguard this fundamental republican principle, systematically disregarded by the influence of Marxism throughout Uruguay’s public education system.
We noted that the proposal, which had initially failed, was revived at the beginning of President Lacalle’s administration, marking a pause in the dominance that the left had exercised for fifteen years.
The chosen venue was therefore the House of Representatives, and the initiative was led by Representative Dr. Felipe Schipani.
The bill incorporated Bordaberry’s rationale and maintained the creation of the Council on Secularism.
Its Statement of Reasons explains that the “proposal is not new; it formed part of the Colorado Party’s government platform in the 2014 elections, and a bill with similar characteristics was introduced by Senator Pedro Bordaberry.”
Schipani’s version, co-sponsored by other Colorado Party legislators, introduced several modifications.
It reduced the Council on Secularism to three members and removed any involvement of private education.
Why was that modification made? Was it assumed that this would generate less resistance?
What remains clear is that the fundamental concept—that the State must remain neutral in religious matters—must also extend “to proselytizing in other areas, such as the promotion of political ideologies.”
Moreover, that extension does not arise from the approval of an ordinary law, but from the Constitution of the Republic itself.
Strictly speaking, the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy defines “secularism” (laicidad) as the “principle establishing the separation between civil and religious society.”
Admittedly, a dictionary is not the Constitution. But does that principle actually arise from the Uruguayan Constitution?
Here we encounter the well-worn saying that “in law there are always two schools of thought.”
Not everyone even agrees with that.
Constitutional scholar Dr. José Korseniak has argued that, at times, the second school of thought “is invented for political, personal or other interests.”
Which means it would amount to a spurious interpretation.
He made that observation in connection with a subject unrelated to the one being discussed here.
Unfortunately, he was not as emphatic on that occasion as he was when the issue concerned the annulment of the Expiry Law.
It is worth recalling that this law was first subjected to a referendum and, many years later, to an attempted constitutional amendment intended to nullify it. On both occasions it was upheld by the Electoral Body.
The Constitution is explicit: “Sovereignty in all its fullness resides fundamentally in the Nation” (Article 4).
“Its sovereignty shall be exercised directly by the Electoral Body in cases of elections, initiative and referendum” (Article 82).
The Electoral Body is the body of citizens legally entitled to vote.
Is it consistent with the rule of law for a parliamentary majority to annul or repeal a law that has been ratified by the Electoral Body?
Yet that is precisely what occurred. A Marxist majority swept aside the will of the citizenry.
On that occasion, Dr. Korseniak stated that “from a legal standpoint, I believe Parliament has no authority to annul or repeal provisions approved by the Electoral Body. These two decisions amounted precisely to that: a ratification of the text by the Electoral Body.
I have taught for forty years at the Faculty of Law that Article 82 of the Constitution establishes that the Nation, which is sovereign, exercises that sovereignty directly through the Electoral Body and indirectly through the three representative branches of government.”
He further added that, “in this case, Parliament, being subordinate to the Electoral Body, cannot repeal or annul what has been decided by a superior body such as the Electoral Body. This is my legal position, even if it pains me and I do not like it.”
One must therefore assume that the distinguished constitutional scholar’s interpretation represents the only legitimate school of thought, while the one applied by the Broad Front government was “invented for political, personal or other interests.”
And this apparent digression leads directly to the grounds on which university actors opposed the proposal.
To be continued.

Constitutional secularism
Popular sovereignty
Limits of parliamentary power

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